I have spent a great deal of time towards the end of my research on the question of openness in academia. There is an openness for the field of philosophy to engage with other disciplines and adopt new methods of inquiry, however there is a particular resistance to this move ingrained in the discipline itself. What inspired this track of my thinking was an essay I came across by Bonnie Mann titled, “The Difference of Feminist Phenomenology: The Case of Shame.” Mann contends that feminist shcolarship in all areas of philosophy is up against “an affective problem, not a cognitive one.” Mann calls attention to the “problem of reverence” that prevents philosophy—especially feminist phenomenology—from considering new methods of theorizing and interpreting.
Mann’s essay has been illuminating for me in tying together my research because it makes me think about how affective states themselves impact the way we do and consider scholarship. I started this research thinking I was opening up the discipline of philosophy by re-centering human affect and Foucault in my work. But now I realize it is also the case that human affect, such as feelings of respect and reverence, also impact our ability to be open to interdisciplinary development in the field. In a way, the process of enacting this interdisciplinary research and thinking about ways to use Foucault’s work in non-canonical ways has been an exercise in intervening on my own affective commitments about how my work is supposed to turn out; despite my willingness to use these texts in new ways, I encounter resistance when I wonder if this is the kind of academic work that is “acceptable.”
And I am learning that it is not the case that anything goes. It is a difficult task to think about new ways of reading old texts while also keeping in mind how this can introduce new problems to be critiqued in scholarship. Gayle Salamon expresses the openness to the practical applicability of philosophy when she asks, “What future promise might be offered by the intertwining of these two apparently ‘outmoded’ styles of thought, phenomenology and critique?” (Salamon, 13; emphasis added). As I continue my work this month and write my paper, I want to think about the problem and promise of openness that comes with any kind of Gallatin research project.
